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Abstract—This paper proposes a new approach to de-
termine trust in resource-constrained networks of au-
tonomous systems based on their physical behaviour, using
the motion of nodes within a team to detect and identify
malicious or failing operation within their cohort. This is
accomplished by looking at operations in the underwater
marine environment. We present a series of composite
metrics based on physical movement, and apply these
metrics to the detection and discrimination of sample
physical misbehaviours. This approach opens the possi-
bility of bringing information about both the physical
and communications behaviours of autonomous MANETs
together to strengthen and expand the application of
future Trust Management Frameworks in sparse and/or
resource constrained environments.
1. Introduction
Early attempts to secure and protect the integrity
of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks have relied on various
forms of strong-cryptography to protect information be-
ing transferred from tampering or malicious inspection.
While such approaches protect the integrity of indi-
vidual pieces of data, the increased computation, and
storage requirements of modern, strong, decentralised
cryptographic systems presents a clear avenue for De-
nial of Service (DoS) attacks on MANETs [1]. This
threat is particularly relevant in resource-constrained
networks, where one or more aspects of the environment
are limited, be it available power, mobility, data storage,
onboard processing, bandwidth, and channel resources
such as capacity and delay. In such networks, where
there is a requirement of security and/or integrity moni-
toring, strong-cryptographic methods present an entirely
new opportunity to potential attackers.
One solution to the trade-off between DoS-
protection, and security is the assessment of “trust-
worthiness” of nodes within a local network. “Trust”
is an assessment of the capability of a node based
on previously observed behaviour. Using this Trust to
make simple routing decisions is significantly simpler
and faster that strong-cryptographic methods, partic-
ularly in multi-hop networks or resource constrained
networks [1]. With Trust being reliant on the near-real-
time awareness of some behaviour, and cryptography
on the pre-establishment of some entropy store and
the repeated reinforcement of that numerical security,
these represent two very different approaches to system
integrity with very different costs/benefits. In practice,
some elements of both methodologies will be used in
different contexts and applications. These approaches
to operational security have been totally focused on
the establishment of trust/security in the communica-
tions domain, and ignore other potential threats to the
network can be exploited through physical movement.
This threat is particularly evident in collaborative au-
tonomous systems where nodes are tasked to accom-
plish some survey / exploration / observation objective
in a distributed fashion, where individual nodes make
decisions based on the actions of their “team”.
This collaboration opens the opportunity for a
physically-misbehaving actor to selfishly conserve it’s
own resources, or maliciously “drain” a given tar-
get node. Current security / trust systems applied to
MANETs are not concerned with the threat of such
physical misbehaviours. This paper proposes a new
approach to trust in resource-constrained networks of
autonomous systems based on their physical behaviour.
This paper proposes a new approach to trust in resource-
constrained networks of autonomous systems based on
their physical behaviour. This is accomplished by look-
ing at operations in the underwater marine environment
and using the motion parameters of nodes in a team to
generate a series of composite metrics based on physical
movement, and apply these metrics to the detection and
discrimination of sample physical misbehaviours.
In the majority of Trusted autonomous mobile net-
work implementations, a free space RF communications
protocol such as 802.11 is used to derive all informa-
tion about the trustworthy operation of the network.
Most of these trust frameworks use a single type of
observed communication action to derive trust assess-
ments, typically successfully delivered or forwarded
packets. By their nature, such implementations rely on
relatively high bandwidth, low noise, low latency, and
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high channel occupancy where contention is tolerable.
In contrast; in underwater environments, communica-
tions are sparse, delayful, noisy, and very prone to
destructive contention. Observations of the communica-
tions processes used to assess trust occur much less fre-
quently, with much greater error (noise) and delay than
is experienced in terrestrial RF MANETs. In addition
to the communications challenges, other considerations
such as command and control isolation, power and
locomotive limitations and the increasing drive towards
the use of teams of smaller, cheaper, almost disposable
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), particularly
in defence, ecological and petrochemical fields, present
unique threats against trust management.
In Section 2, we review the current use cases, de-
ployments and mobility patterns of collaborative AUV
operations, and the state-of-the-art in underwater local-
isation techniques. In Section 3, we discuss the use of
TMFs and their applicability to marine operations. In
Section 4, we propose a collection of metrics to char-
acterise the physical behaviours of nodes, and establish
a set of physical “misbehaviours” to assess these. In
Section 5, we design a series of simulations, and tests
to assess the detection and identification capabilities of
three potential physical metrics for trust assessment. In
Section 6, we assess the successful detection and iden-
tification characteristics of a series of tests, culminating
in the generation and testing of a simple rule based
behaviour classifier.
2. AUV Mobility and Localisation
The use of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles
(AUVs) has greatly expanded in recent years; current
applications and considerations are summarised below.
2.1. AUV operations and deployments
2.1.1. Hydrographic Survey. The use of AUVs in the
place of manned-surface platforms or tethered undersea
platforms enables greatly increased spatial and temporal
sampling. Importantly, the separation of AUVs from the
noisy sea surface enables much more efficient survey
operations. This is particularly important when compar-
ing to classical tow-line based measurements; where the
mobility of the AUVs enables for much tighter-turning
survey patterns or operation in inaccessible or hard-to-
reach locations such as polar survey [2].
Another significant factor is cost; the daily cost of
operating a manned vessel can be considerably higher
than the costs of deploying, operating and recovering
one or more AUVs with equivalent capabilities [3].
Additionally, the use of low-power “glider” AUVs has
lowered the barrier to entry for extended mission types,
such as persistent environmental survey, or open-ocean
operations. Depth-hardened AUVs have also opened up
the deepest parts of the oceans to exploration, with
onboard autonomy, imagery and Simultaneous Loca-
tion and Mapping (SLAM) techniques allowing deep-
dwelling survey AUVs to react to bottom-surface fea-
tures without the need for a tight craft-to-surface control
loop [4]. The natural extension of these kind of appli-
cations is the use of AUVs on ice-covered planets and
moons such as Europa, where three-dimensional, au-
tonomous navigation without an on-the-loop controller
is vital for mission resource efficiency and success.
2.1.2. Hull & Infrastructure Inspection. Concerns re-
garding the security, safety and legality of international
shipping has driven the use of AUVs for near-surface
hull and infrastructure inspections, looking for damage
as well as devices such as limpet mines and contraband.
This puts a range of unique pressures on the AUV sys-
tem; requiring highly accurate three-dimensional local-
isation and path-planning to clearly image the contours
of a hull [3]. With the increasing use and criticality
of intercontinental undersea optical fibre connections,
using AUVs for both the laying of and inspection of
these cables is an exciting area of work [5][6].
2.1.3. Marine Petrochemical. Oil & Gas industry re-
quirements for high quality, low altitude bathymetry
of seabed structures for infrastructure development
(pipelines/drill platforms etc.) as well as monitoring of
those structures over time (inspection etc.) is another
driver of research investment. As in Hydrography, the
mobility of AUVs is the biggest single advantage over
classical platforms[7].
2.1.4. Military. Mine-Countermeasure operations ben-
efit greatly from, and significantly drive, AUV devel-
opment; the ability to rapidly explore and covertly
survey a potentially dangerous area without risking a
human operator is a major benefit. This benefit applies
to protection as well as incursion; the ability to have
persistent survey of a valuable area such as a forward-
operating harbour is increasingly essential, and as AUV
technology, autonomy and security practices develop,
this use is increasing. This Port Protection capability is
particularly complex; teams of AUVs are expected to
repeatedly survey an area and remain densely-connected
enough to maintain end-to-end communications with
all other nodes, in the face of an environment that
is possibly not well surveyed initially, and includes
dynamically moving obstacles (i.e. ships). In Sec. 5,
we use this Port Protection scenario as a baseline for
our simplified simulation context.
2.2. Localisation Technologies
Given the subsurface nature of most AUV opera-
tions, terrestrial localisation techniques such as GPS
are unavailable (below ≈ 20cm depth). However, a
range of alternative techniques are used to maintain
spacial awareness to a high degree of accuracy in the
underwater environment.
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2.2.1. Long baseline (LBL). Long-baseline localisa-
tion systems use a series of (usually) static surface/cable
networked acoustic transponders to provide coordinated
beacons and (usually) GPS-backed relative location in-
formation to local subsurface users. Such systems can
be accurate to less that 0.1m or better in ideal deploy-
ments and are regularly used in controlled autonomous
survey environments such as harbour patrol operations
where the deployment area is bounded. However, the
initial setup and configuration required in advance of
any AUV operation makes LBL difficult to utilise in
unbounded or contended areas. LBL systems can also
be deployed on mobile surface platforms in the area
(ships or buoys for example), but these applications
put significant computational pressure on the end-point
AUV and have greatly reduced accuracy compared to
ideal deployments [8].
2.2.2. Doppler Velocity Log (DVL). DVL uses the
emission of directed acoustic “pings” that reflect off sea
bed/surface interfaces which, when received back on the
craft with multi-beam phased array acoustic transducers
can measure both the absolute depth/altitude (z-axis)
of the craft and through directional Doppler shifting,
the relative (xy-translative) motion of the craft since
the ping. While classical DVL was highly sensitive
to shifting currents in the water column, advances in
the development of Acoustic Doppler Current Profiling
(ADCP) has turned that situation on its head, enabling
the compensation-for and measurement-of water cur-
rents down to the sub-meter level [9].
2.2.3. Inertial Navigation Systems (INS). Inertial nav-
igation systems use gyroscopic procession to observe
the relative acceleration of a mobile platform. This
reference-relative monitoring is particularly useful in
the underwater environment, as it detects the motion of
AUVs as they are carried by the water itself. Bias Drift
is a significant problem for INS systems operating over
longer (hundreds of metres) distances, as they usually
have some minimal amount of directional bias which
incurs a cumulative effect over time without correction.
Several sensor synthesis processes have been demon-
strated which combine information from INS along with
DVL data to improve localisation into the sub-decimeter
level [10].
2.2.4. Simultaneous Location and Mapping
(SLAM). Simultaneous Location and Mapping is
the process of iteratively developing a feature-based
model of an environment, and to use the relative
movement within that modeled environment to obtain
estimates of absolute positioning. SLAM has been
most well developed in the contexts of either visual-
based inspection using cameras, or LIDAR-style
distance triangulation, however the same principles
have been successfully applied using marine sonar
readings, providing sub-meter accuracy, real-time,
feature-relative localisation information that is (for the
most part) environmentally agnostic [11].
In summary, current technology enables AUVs to
localise to a sub-metre accuracy in most contexts.
3. Trust Management Frameworks
Trust Management Frameworks (TMFs) provide in-
formation to assist the estimation of future states and ac-
tions of nodes operating as teams or networks. This in-
formation is used to optimize the performance of a team
against malicious, selfish, or defective misbehaviour by
one or more nodes. Previous research has established
the advantages of implementing communications-based
TMFs in terrestrial, 802.11 based MANETs, particu-
larly in terms of preventing selfish operation in collab-
orative systems [12], and maintaining throughput in the
presence of malicious actors [13]. These observations
then inform future decisions of individual nodes, for
example, route selection [14].
Recent work has demonstrated the use of a number
of metrics to form a “vector” of trust. The Multi-
parameter Trust Framework for MANETs (MTFM) uses
a range of communications metrics beyond packet loss
rate (PLR) to assess trust [15]. This vectorized trust also
allows a system to detect and identify the tactics being
used to undermine trust. This method as been previ-
ously applied to the marine space, comparing against
a selection of existing communications TMFs showing
that MTFM is more effective at detecting misbehaviours
in sparse communications environments [16].
4. Physical Behaviours for Trust
4.1. Physical Metrics
Three physical metrics are used to encompass the
relative distributions and activities of nodes within the
network; Inter-node Distance Deviation (INDD), Inter-
node Heading Deviation (INHD), and Node Speed.
Conceptually, INDD is a measure of the average spacing
of an observed node with respect to its neighbours.
INHD is a similar approach with respect to node orien-
tation. As such, these metrics completely encapsulate
and abstract the physical behaviour of any node, po-
tentially performing any misbehaviour. Given that local
nodes within the team are aware of the reported posi-
tions and velocities of their neighbours, it is believed
that this is a reasonable initial set of metrics to establish
the usefulness of physical metrics of trust assessment.
INDDi,j =
|Pj −
∑
x
Px
N |
1
N
∑
x
∑
y |Px − Py|(∀x 6= y)
(1)
INHDi,j = vˆ|v = Vj −
∑
x
Vx
N
(2)
Vi,j = |Vj | (3)
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Where i and j are indices denoting the current observer
node and the current observed node respectively; x
is a summation index representing other nodes in the
observers region of concern; Pj is the [x, y, z] absolute
position of the observed node (relative to some coordi-
nated origin point agreed upon at launch) and V j is the
[x, y, z] velocity of the observed node. Thus, the metric
vector used for the physical-trust assessment from one
observer node to a given target node is;
Xi,j = {INDDi,j , INHDi,j , , Vi,j} (4)
At each time-step, each node will have a separate X
assessment vector for each node it has observed in that
time.
Additional metric sets may be more suitable for
certain contexts, platforms or operations, however these
were selected in collaboration with UK DSTL and
NATO CMRE as suitable, generic, assessments, viable
on most current platforms in most current deployment
schemes.
4.2. Physical Misbehaviours
Misbehaviours in the communications space is
heavily investigated area in MANETs [17][18][19], but
attacks and misbehaviours in the physical space are
far less explored. As in the communications space,
the primary drivers of any deliberate “misbehaviour”
come under two general categories; selfish operation or
malicious subterfuge. Autonomous MANETs in general
rely (or are at least, most effective) when all nodes op-
erate fairly, be that in terms of their bandwidth sharing,
energy usage, routing optimality or other factors. Phys-
ically, if a node is being “selfish”, it may preferentially
move to the edge of a network to minimise it’s dynamic
work allocation, or depending on it’s intent, may insert
itself into the centre of a network to maximise it’s
ability to capture, monitor, and manipulate traffic going
across the network. In the context of a secure operation
(or one that’s assumed to be secure), the opportunity
for capturing a legitimate node and replacing it with
a modified clone. Assuming a highly capable outside
actor and a multi-channel communications opportunity,
there is also the possibility of a node appearing to
“play along” with the crowd that occasionally breaks
rank to route internal transmissions to a outside agent.
In the underwater context this may mean an AUV
following the rest of a team along a survey path and
occasionally “breaking surface” to communicate to a
malicious controller. Alternatively, if an inserted node is
not totally aware of a given mission parameter, such as
a particular survey or waypointing path, it may simply
follow along, hoping not to be noticed.
In all these cases, such behaviour involves some ele-
ment of behaving differently from the rest of the team,
however, there are other cases where such individual
“deviance” is observed; where a node is in some kind
of “failure state”. In the underwater context, this could
be damage to the drive-train or navigation systems,
causing it to lag behind or consistently drift off course.
An ideal physical trust management system should be
able to differentiate between “malicious” behaviours
and “failing” behaviours.
To investigate this hypothesis, we create two “bad”
behaviours; one deliberately malicious, where a cloned
node is unaware of the missions’ survey parameters
and attempts to “hide” among the fleet, and a “failing”
node, with an impaired drive train, increasing the drag
force on the node’s propulsion system (conceptually a
simulated propeller-strike). These two behaviours are
designated Shadow and SlowCoach respectively.
5. Simulation and Validation
5.1. Simulation Background
Simulations were conducted using a Python based
agent framework, SimPy [20], with a network stack
built upon AUVNetSim [21], with transmission param-
eters taken from and validated against [22] and [23].
For the purposes of this paper, this network is used
for the dissemination of node location information,
assuming suitable compression of internally assumed
location data compressed into one 4096 bit acoustic data
frame, with the network overall emitting approximately
10 frames a minute. Node kinematics are modelled on
REMUS 100 AUVs, based on limits and core charac-
teristics given in [24], [25] and [26]. These limits are
given in Table 1. For the purposes of this exploratory
case we do not model the hydrodynamics of the control
surfaces of the AUVs, however we do model axial drag
as a resistive inertial force.
TABLE 1. REMUS 100 MOBILITY CONSTRAINTS AS APPLIED IN
SIMULATION
Parameter Unit Value
Length m 5.5
Diameter m 0.5
Mass kg 37
Max Speed ms−1 2.5
Cruising Speed ms−1 1.5
Max X-axis Turn ◦s−1 4.5
Max Y-axis Turn ◦s−1 4.5
Max Z-axis Turn ◦s−1 4.5
Axial Drag Coefficient (cd) NA 3
Cross Section Area m2 0.13
5.2. Node Control Modelling
We use the example of a Port Protection scenario,
where a team of six AUVs are tasked with surveying
a simplified harbour; a 1km x 1km x 100m cuboid
volume. This is accomplished through a distributed
waypoint system where by the team must regularly
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“check” several points around the exterior and interior
of this volume. Boidean flocking behaviour [27] is used
in addition to the cubic waypoint-survey behaviour to
provide both collision-avoidance capability and main-
taining node communications. This consists of three
heuristic rules; Cohesion, Repulsion and Alignment.
Fj,C =F+
pj , 1
N
N∑
∀i 6=j
pi, dmax
 (5)
Fj,R =
N∑
∀i 6=j
F−
(
pj , pi, dmax)
∣∣dmax > ‖pi − pj‖)
(6)
Fj,A =
1
N
·
 N∑
∀i 6=j
vˆi
 (7)
Where F ’s are force-vectors applied to the internal
guidance of the AUV, Cohesion Fj,C ; Repulsion Fj,R;
and Alignment Fj,A, F+ is a scaled vector attraction
function, and F− is an equivalent repulsion function
F+(p
i, pj) =(p̂i − pj)× |p
i − pj |
d
= F−(pj , pi) (8)
5.3. Standards of Accuracy
The key question addressed in this paper is to assess
the advantages and disadvantages of utilising trust from
the physical domain. The “effectiveness” of any trust
assessment framework is taken as consisting of several
parts, the accuracy of detection and identification of a
particular misbehaviour, the complexity of such anal-
ysis, including any specific training required, and the
differentiability of behaviours using given metrics. In
this case we are particularly interested in the accuracy
of detection and identification of malicious / failing
behaviours, and as such are looking at three key char-
acteristics of accuracy; true detection accuracy; false
positive rates; and misidentification rates.
As such we have three primary questions to answer
to establish if these metrics are useful: How accurate
are these metrics in being able to easily differentiate
between Normal and Abnormal behaviours in terms of
True-Positive and False-Positive rates? What differen-
tiation of metric response, if any, is there between the
stated abnormal behaviours? Can a simple classifier be
built to characterise these differentiations of response,
and what is it’s True-Positive/False-Positive accuracy?
5.4. Analysis
Sixty-four simulation runs are executed for each
scenario (i.e. one node “Maliciously” following the fleet
with no mission information (Shadow), one “Failing”
node with simulated drive train issues (SlowCoach), and
one baseline control scenario where all nodes are be-
having appropriately (Control). Each of these simulated
missions last for an hour, matching realistic deployment
times based on current MOD/NATO operations[28].
In order to assess the viability of using the previ-
ously discussed metrics, the raw motion paths recorded
by the simulation are fed into an analysis pipeline aimed
at abstracting the instantaneous observed values into
derived deviations from “normal” behaviour in the team.
dm,ti,j = x
m,t
i,j −
∑
k x
m,t
i,k
|M | (9)
αm,ti,j =
∣∣∣∣∣ d
m,t
i,j
σ(dm,ti,j )
∣∣∣∣∣ (10)
Cmi =
∑
t
αm,ti ∗
(∑
x 6=i Σtα
m,t
x
N − 1
)−1
(11)
Where i and j are indices denoting the current ob-
server node and the current observed node respectively;
xk is a summation index representing other nodes in the
observers region of concern; X is the vector of metrics
from (4) and m is the index of a particular metric in
X; d is an intermediate value of the deviance of a
given observation from the mean, and α is a normalised
response value in terms of it’s deviation from the mean
at that instance. Cmi is an inferred “Confidence” value
denoting the relative “Deviation of Deviation” between
a given nodes response in a given metric to the rest of
its cohort in that metric.
5.4.1. Behaviour Detection and Classification. A sim-
ple misbehaviour detection is to apply Dixon’s Q-
test [29] to the resultant
∑
t α values for each node
for each metric for each run, establishing if a misbe-
having node exists in a given run, and to identify that
misbehaving node. We use a Confidence Interval of
95%. Our initial hypothesis is that by using observations
of the previously stated physical metrics, that we will
be able to detect and identify misbehaviours. Within
that context, this Confidence Interval indicates that we
would expect only a 5% chance that any run or node
identified using the Q-test to not be a misbehaving
run/node. Additionally, by applying the Q-test on a per-
metric basis, we can use the “votes” of each metric as a
simplified consensus classifier. This classifier may allow
us to characterise some aspect of a given misbehaviour
in terms of metrics it heavily impacts, and those that are
less affected, finding some differentiating-limit between
certain behaviours using certain metrics.
5.4.2. Operational Performance Metrics. While not
the focus of this paper, we are also concerned with
the impact of these misbehaviours on the mission ef-
ficiency. We monitor this in three main measurements;
the speed of the fleet in terms of how many of it’s
port-protection waypoints nodes pass, the total energy
used for communications, and the average end-to-end
delay in the acoustic network. We would expect that
any misbehaviour in positioning will incur some loss of
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efficiency, whether it is the fleet being slowed down by a
“SlowCoach” attempting to catch up or of a node mov-
ing in an unexpected way dragging the team temporar-
ily off course. Given that in acoustic communications,
transmission is energetically expensive while reception
is not, and while physical misbehaviours will not impact
the amount of offered load on the network, collisions
induced by un-even distribution of nodes should have
a small but measurable effect on the energy used for
packet reception.
6. Results and Discussion
Fig. 1 shows the raw metric values (vertically) from
one run of each behaviour (horizontally). It clear from
the INDD and INHD metric responses in the both
misbehaviour cases (Shadow / SlowCoach), Alfa is the
outlier and other nodes are all consistent in their metric
values. This outlier-response is not nearly as clear in the
Speed metric case (bottom row of Fig. 1). Looking at
the differen behaviours; it appears that the Shadow be-
haviour is creating the largest, most obvious deviations.
In Fig. 2 the metric values are normalised as per (10).
This highlights the outlying-characteristic of INHD and
INDD; largely eliminating the other nodes-responses. In
the Speed response of Fig. 2, the Speed metric is not
obviously highlighting any significant misbehaviours in
that metric. From Fig. 3, normalising across the duration
of each run, it appears that Speed is being affected
differently between the two misbehaviours, and much
less so than INHD/INDD.
6.1. Detection of Misbehaviours
We have demonstrated that INHD and INDD ap-
pear to accurately and obviously identify the malicious
node in the case that there is one. Using the deviance
normalisation presented in (10), we can observe clear,
almost contiguous areas under the Alfa-values in Fig. 2
in the Shadow and SlowCoach misbehaviours. From
Fig. 3, while the deviance in Speed is not as strong
as the deviance in INHD and INDD, it varys between
misbehaviours, indiciating that Speed may be a way to
analytically differentiate between the two behaviours.
To investigate how this would relate to the ability
to blindly detect misbehaviours, the Q-test is applied
to Σα results as used in Fig. 3, to attempt to correctly
establish if a node is misbehaving and and if so, which
node. As such the “correctness” rule for assessing this
strategy is that, in misbehaving cases, the test should
return “Alfa” (otherwise a “Fail” is recorded), and in
the Control case, the test should assert that there are
no outliers, (otherwise a “Fail” is recorded again). In
Table 2, the Control case is correctly identified 92%
of the time. The “malicious”, Shadow misbehaviour
is detected and identified 98% of the time, and the
“failing”, SlowCoach misbehaviour is identified just
TABLE 2. OVERALL Q-TEST OUTLIER DETECTION ACCURACY
Behaviour Mean Std
Control 0.927 0.261
Shadow 0.979 0.144
SlowCoach 0.792 0.408
TABLE 3. PER-METRIC Q-TEST OUTLIER DETECTION
ACCURACY
Behaviour INDD INHD Speed
Mean Control 0.875 0.938 0.969
Shadow 1.000 1.000 0.938
SlowCoach 1.000 1.000 0.375
Std Control 0.336 0.246 0.177
Shadow 0.000 0.000 0.246
SlowCoach 0.000 0.000 0.492
79% of the time. These values match our intuition from
Figs. 1 & 2.
We can investigate this further by looking at the
“correctness” of the assessments of each metric in-
dividually (Table 3). From this we can see that in
both misbehaviours, INHD and INDD correctly identify
Alfa as the misbehaver 100% of the time. However,
they mis-detect a potential misbehaviour in the Control
case 13% and 7% of the time respectively. Meanwhile,
Speed correctly identified the Control case 97% of
the time, and the Shadow case 94% of the time, but
missed the SlowCoach behaviour 63% of the time. This
result is surprising on the face of it, as SlowCoach
is a misbehaviour that is exclusively about individual
node speed and conceptually should have had a much
larger impact on the simple Speed metric. However, the
collaborative nature of the collision avoidance system,
and the existing limits on node kinematics from Table 1
appear to be hiding this impact.
6.2. Identification of Misbehaviours
Having established the detection of physical misbe-
haviour to a statistically significant level, and a demon-
strable difference in metric-response to different mis-
behaviours, we now focus on our last question from
Sec. 5.3; can we construct a simple classifier based on
a subset of our results and apply it blindly to a new set
of results?
TABLE 4. METRIC CONFIDENCE RESPONSES
Behaviour INDD INHD Speed
Mean Control 1.064 0.966 1.010
Shadow 4.059 3.374 2.098
SlowCoach 4.246 3.352 1.491
Std Control 0.262 0.113 0.132
Shadow 0.398 0.436 0.206
SlowCoach 0.198 0.288 0.180
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Figure 1. Observed Metric Values for one simulation of each behaviour (xm,ti,j from (9))
Figure 2. Normalised Deviance values from one simulation of each behaviour (αm,ti,j from (10))
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Figure 3. Per-Node-Per-Run deviance for each metric, normalised in time (
∑
α/T )
As we can already establish the Control case accu-
rately, we continue to use the Q-test across all metrics
for that case and concentrate of differentiating between
the misbehaviours.
From (11), we can establish the per-metric-per-
behaviour “Confidence” in the relationship between a
given metric deviance and each behaviour and use the
as a “signature” for that behaviour. From Table 4 we
observe that INHD and INDD have similar responses
to both misbehaviours, with significant standard devi-
ations, but the response of the Speed metric is much
more stable and discernible; across the range of train-
ing simulation runs, the SlowCoach behaviour centres
around 1.5, while the Shadow behaviour centres around
2.0, with these centres being at least one standard
deviation away from each other. Our generated classifier
is formalised in (12).
C →

Q95(X) = ∅, Control
Q95(X) 6= ∅ ∧ SpeedX ≤ 1.75, Shadow
Q95(X) 6= ∅ ∧ SpeedX > 1.75, SlowCoach
(12)
Applying this simplified classifier to a blind test
set of simulations (of the same scale) gives surpris-
ingly positive results as shown in Table 5, with greater
than 90% identification rates for both misbehaviours.
However, in the Null (Control) case we experience a
false-positive rate of nearly 30%, that is to say that
in the case where there is no misbehaviour, 30% of
the time a node will be mis-identified as misbehaving
when it is not. These are strongly positive results for
the use of physical metrics for behaviour discrimination;
with INHD and INDD proving as strong and obvious
“canaries” of misbehaviour, and Speed in this case
proving a capable differentiator between conceptually
close misbehaviours.
6.3. Impacts of Misbehaviour on operational
performance
Anticipated “small but measurable” effects to com-
munications performance and energy usage are ex-
TABLE 5. IDENTIFICATION RATES ON UNTRAINED RESULTS
USING (12)
True Behaviour Probability of Correct Blind Identification
Control 0.719
Shadow 0.906
SlowCoach 0.938
tremely small and within the bounds of statistical uncer-
tainty. One observation of merit was an observed 10%
increase in end-to-end delay in the case of the Shadow
behaviour, due to the misbehaving node “overshoot-
ing” the mission waypoints, losing connection to some
more distant nodes, causing retransmissions and delays.
Waypoint passing rates were identical to within 2%
error across all behaviours, and fleet distance remained
within a similar margin. It’s possible that our selected
behaviours were too unambitious in our impacts, and fu-
ture work will have to investigate the impact of “heavy-
handed” or destructive behaviours on the operational
efficiency of autonomous networks.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated that with cur-
rent underwater localisation techniques, that in certain
mobility models, that a set of geometric abstractions
(INHD, INDD, and Speed), between nodes as part of
an Underwater MANET can be used as a Trust As-
sessment and Establishment metric. These metrics are
application-agnostic and could potentially be applied
in other areas of mobile autonomy such as terrestrial,
aerial, and mixed MANETs.
We show, using a Port-Protection waypoint-led sce-
nario built upon a Boidian collision prevention be-
haviour that in a simulated underwater environment,
the outputs of these metrics can be used to detect and
differentiate between exemplar malicious behaviour and
potential failure states. This verification further supports
the assertions the assertion that it is practical to extend
Trust protocols such as Multi-parameter Trust Frame-
work for MANETS (MTFM) [15] to include metrics
and observations from the physical domain as well as
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those from the communication domain [30]. This com-
bination of physical and “logical” information further
supports the decentralised and distributed establishment
of observation based Trust.
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